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Abstract 
For almost a decade all three Baltic countries have witnessed substantial deficits on the current 
accounts of the balance of payments. This paper discusses whether this situation should be a 
matter of concern. Recent literature on the sustainability of balance of payments deficits is 
reviewed and put into a Baltic context. The main conclusion is that the recurrent large deficits in 
the Baltic countries pose a risk for the fixed exchange-rate policies until the countries adopt the 
euro. In the longer term, large deficits will influence the time path of convergence of living 
standards between the Baltic countries and the EU as a whole.   
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ARE THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS 
IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES SUSTAINABLE? 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 207/JULY 2004 
JORGEN DRUD HANSEN AND MORTEN HANSEN 
 
1.  Introduction 
After the huge initial output declines and high inflation rates in the Baltic states following the 
breakaway from the Soviet Union and the establishment of open-market economies, the three 
Baltic states appear as success stories. Since 1995, real GDP has grown at an average annual 
rate of 5.7% in each of the countries, inflation has been in single digits since 1998 and is now 
at EU levels, budget deficits are below 3% of GDP, debt-to-GDP ratios would make most EU 
countries envious, trade has increased and seen a major reorientation towards the West and 
FDI inflows have been substantial. 
Nevertheless, in this flattering list of excellent marks for economic performance at least one 
possible sign of weakness may be identified. For most of the past decade the current accounts 
of the balance of payments have been severely in deficit for all three Baltic countries and 
there is no apparent sign of a reversal of this general pattern. Lawrence Summers, writing in 
an article in The Economist warned that “close attention should be paid to any current account 
deficit in excess of 5% of GDP if it is financed in a way that could lead to rapid reversals” 
(Summers, 1995). If this statement is to be taken at face value, warning signs should be 
flashing for the Baltic countries – average annual current account deficits for the period 1995–
2002 have been 8.1% for Estonia, 7.1% for Latvia and a whopping 8.6% for Lithuania. The 
purpose of this working paper is to consider this problem and discuss whether the present 
trend of current account deficits in the Baltic countries is sustainable.  
The sustainability of the balance of payments position of a country is not a concept easily 
dealt with. Basically, it is associated with the long-term solvency of a country (see for 
example Roubini & Wachtel, 1998; Edwards, 2001). A more policy-oriented definition of 
sustainability is suggested by Milesi-Ferretti & Razin (1996) who characterise a given balance 
of payments deficit as sustainable if the balance of payments position is consistent with a 
continuation of present economic policy, i.e. no dramatic changes in the economic policy are 
deemed necessary. Attention is paid in particular to the question of whether the balance of 
payments deficit endangers the exchange-rate policy of a country and thus exposes the 
country to the risk of a currency crisis. A currency crisis is defined, in case of a flexible 
exchange-rate regime as a sharp depreciation, or, in case of a fixed exchange-rate regime, a 
depletion of central bank foreign reserves and ultimately a forced devaluation (see Edwards, 
2001 for a more thorough discussion).  
All three Baltic countries have adopted fixed exchange-rate systems as the main pillar for 
their economic policy. In June 1992 Estonia established a currency board arrangement based 
on a peg of the Estonian kroon to the Deutschmark and from 1 January 1999 the Estonian 
kroon was automatically re-pegged to the euro.  
Similarly, in April 1994, Lithuania established a currency board arrangement although the 
Lithuanian currency, the litas, was initially pegged to the US dollar. In February 2002 the litas 2 | HANSEN & HANSEN 
was smoothly re-pegged to the euro. Latvia introduced a hard peg to the IMF Special Drawing 
Right (SDR) in February 1994 and since then the exchange rate of the Latvian lat has been 
linked to this basket with the dollar and the euro as its most important currencies. 
All three Baltic countries voted overwhelmingly in 2003 in favour of joining the EU 
(Lithuania on 10–11 May, Estonia on 14 September and Latvia on 20 September). With 
membership of the European Union from 1 May 2004, the new member states are committed 
to aim at joining the economic and monetary union (EMU) and thus adopt the euro when they 
fulfil the Maastricht convergence criteria. One of the criteria demands that the countries 
should subordinate their exchange rate policy to the exchange rate mechanism II (ERM II), a 
target-zone system with broad (+/– 15%) fluctuation bands around a central parity to the euro. 
Technically, the Baltic countries could therefore be prone to currency crises until their 
adoption of the euro. When the euro is finally adopted, probably after three to five years of 
EU membership, the risk of currency crises is ultimately removed.
1  
Concerns over the high deficits on the balance of payments in recent years in the Baltic 
countries have been addressed in several papers, such as McGettigan (2000), IMF (2003b, 
2003c) and Gurtner (2003). The latest assessments by the IMF (2003b, 2003c), paint a 
comparatively bright picture of the future development for the Baltic economies although it is 
stressed that the economic policy “strategy [in these countries] is not without risks” and the 
report later adds that the actual current account deficits in Estonia and Latvia at 12.5% and 
7.75% respectively, “are clearly unsustainable over medium-to-longer term” (IMF, 2003b, pp. 
4-5) and the high current account deficit “render the economy more vulnerable to external 
shocks” (IMF, 2003b, p. 14). Gurtner (2003) provides evidence from the currency board 
arrangement in Argentina before the crisis there in 2001 and this experience is used for a 
discussion of the stability of the exchange-rate regime in Estonia. Because of several 
structural differences between Argentina and Estonia, such as differences in the degree of 
openness, flexibility in the labour markets and inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), it is 
concluded that Estonia is in a more favourable situation than Argentina. 
Two main arguments have been put forward to support a less concerned view about the 
balance of payments problem in the Baltic countries. First, all the three Baltic countries have 
for years benefited from a large inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), which has 
contributed substantially to financing the deficits. Furthermore, this source of long-term 
financing is perceived as a ‘stable’ source of financing, making reversals of capital flows less 
likely in the immediate future. Second, international competitiveness is seemingly fine in all 
three Baltic countries.
2 
Yet, even in the most optimistic scenario it will take three to five years before the national 
currencies of the Baltic countries are replaced by the euro and the risks of a damaging 
currency crisis during this period needs to be taken seriously. Although there are no serious 
signs of an imminent currency crisis for the Baltic currencies, evidence from currency crises 
in the 1990s have repeatedly demonstrated that such crises may erupt suddenly, taking most 
                                                           
1 The applicant countries for membership of the euro should, in accordance with this Maastricht criterion, 
demonstrate exchange-rate stability in the ERM II system for at least two years before full membership of the 
EMU. Nevertheless, Estonia and Lithuania have been allowed to continue their currency board arrangements 
until the adoption of the euro. Latvia plans to re-peg to the euro from 1 January 2005 (see www.bank.lv).   
2 See IMF (2003b) for an extensive analysis of this issue. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES | 3 
analysts by surprise. Notable examples are the Mexican peso crises in 1994–95 and the crisis 
in Argentina 2001–02, which were not foreseen by highly esteemed forecast institutions.
3  
Based on past experience (and surprises), this paper addresses the question of whether the 
Baltic countries might face the risk of a currency crisis in the future owing to the large and 
persistent structural current-account deficits. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 puts 
the concept of sustainability of a balance of payments deficit into the framework of 
intertemporal optimisation of consumption in open economies. The section concludes by 
suggesting the Milesa-Ferretti & Razin definition, which states that a balance of payments 
deficit is sustainable if the present economic policy can be continued in the long run. Crucial 
to the assessment of this question are the prospects for long-term debt as well as various risk 
indicators for economic policy. Section 3 therefore examines the long-term dynamics of 
external debt and section 4 discusses various economic factors of importance for the 
vulnerability of an economy to a given long-term debt burden, i.e. external debt relative to 
GDP. Based on the sustainability indicators presented in sections 3 and 4, the case for the 
Baltic countries is analysed in section 5. As the long-term debt burden for a given current 
account deficit varies inversely with the rate of economic growth, a part of section 5 is 
devoted to an analysis of the growth prospects for the Baltic countries using Ireland and 
Portugal as benchmark economies. The prospects of future inflows of FDI are also addressed 
in particular in section 5, perceived as they are to be the most stable form of current account 
deficit financing, along with the impact on the balance of payments of structural funds 
transfers from the European Union to the Baltic countries under the present EU Financial 
Framework for 2000–06. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
2.  Balance of payments deficits and intertemporal optimisation of 
consumption and saving  
In open economies where borrowing and lending is possible, the current account reflects 
intertemporal optimisation by consumers. The position on the current account equals national 
savings minus national investments; savings reflect the endeavours of consumers to smooth 
consumption across periods, based on a utility-maximising framework; investments reflect 
maximisation of expected returns for producers from different projects. Differences of 
investment opportunities across countries or differences with respect to consumer preferences 
may cause temporary discrepancies between savings and investments. Yet, fulfilling an 
intertemporal budget constraint implies that deficits on the current account will be reversed to 
surpluses in later periods, making external debt repayable. Hence, from a purely theoretical 
point of view, current account deficits or surpluses do not pose a problem. On the contrary, 
they provide an opportunity in open economies for consumers to increase welfare by 
smoothing consumption over time. This basic view on current account deficits can be traced 
back to Irving Fisher (1930) but has since then been stated several times in standard textbooks 
on macroeconomic theory (for example, see Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1996 or Barro, 1997).
4  
                                                           
3 In December 1994, the same month as the peso crisis started, the OECD published a forecast of the real rate of 
growth for Mexico for 1995 of 4.0% and a rate of inflation of 5.7%. The actual figures turned out to be a real 
rate of growth of minus 6.8% and a rate of inflation of 39.1%. In mid-2001 the IMF forecast a real rate of growth 
in Argentina of 3.7% and a rate of inflation of 0.5% for 2002. The actual figures were a real rate of growth of 
minus 11.0% and inflation of 25.9%. (OECD, 1994 and 1996; IMF 2001 and 2003a) 
4  This setup has been applied to the Baltic countries in IMF (2003c). It is shown that most of the current account 
deficits for these countries during the past decade might be explained as the result of consumption-smoothing 
and productivity growth. 4 | HANSEN & HANSEN 
Public investments and public savings do not change the above conclusion in case of ‘ultra-
rationality’ or the Ricardian equivalence of public debt and taxes. Rational, forward-looking 
consumers take the public budget and debt into account in their intertemporal optimisation 
and public deficits are thus perceived as a future tax commitment, which the consumer 
includes among his liabilities. Frustrated expectations, such as those following external 
shocks or shifts in the perceptions of public sector debt in case of imperfect internalisation of 
the public sector finances, may lead to changes in the optimal consumption plans. But apart 
from very large negative shocks, consumers should be able to adapt planned future 
consumption such that claims from external creditors are not endangered.  
Nevertheless, as addressed initially by Eaton & Gersowitz (1981) the above reasoning only 
addresses the ability but not the willingness to live up to the obligations of debt servicing. To 
deal with the latter question a political economy analysis is necessary, with voters and interest 
groups as the main agents. The outcome of such an analysis could describe cases where the 
political system pursues a macroeconomic policy that may be unsustainable in the long run. If 
the debt burden tends to infinity in the long run then the present economic policy certainly 
cannot be continued – but even in the case where the debt burden tends to stabilise at a finite 
but high level, the present economic policy could collapse because of unexpected refinancing 
problems. Yet there is no exact, critical maximum value for the debt burden beyond which a 
collapse of the economic policy will invariably appear. For a given debt burden the risk of a 
collapse depends on various factors in the economy. The following two sections describe a) 
the long-term dynamics of the debt burden and b) factors that may be important to assess the 
vulnerability of the present economic policy for a given debt burden.  
3.  The dynamics of the long-term debt burden 
The dynamics of the debt problem can be analysed formally by defining the debt burden b by:  
b =  D/PY  (1) 
where D is the total amount of external debt in current prices, P is the price level and Y is the 
real GDP. Disregarding foreign direct investment along with capital gains and losses on 
foreign assets and liabilities in the following simple calculation, the increase in total external 
debt is equal to the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments, i.e. 
iD EX IM CA D + − = − = ) ( &  (2) 
where CA is the position on the current account, (EX – IM) is the trade deficit and i is the 
nominal interest rate. The dot over a variable denotes a change per unit of time of the variable, 
i.e. D &  = dD/dt.  
To calculate the long-term implications for the debt burden if the present economic 
development continues indefinitely, we assume that the real rate of growth of GDP,  y Y Y = / & , 
the rate of inflation,  p P P = / &  and the nominal interest rate i are all constant. Furthermore, it 
is assumed that the primary deficit (the trade deficit), constitutes an exogenous share, h, of 
nominal GDP, i.e.  
IM – EX =  h PY  (3) 
Using these assumptions and substituting the nominal interest rate, i, with the real interest 
rate, r, defined by r = (i – p), the dynamics of the debt burden can be written as:  
b r y h b ) ( − − = &  (4) BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES | 5 
If the real interest rate is less than the real rate of growth of GDP, i.e. r < y, the debt burden 
will in the longer term tend to stabilise at the level calculated in the equation below: 
b* = h / (y – r)  (5) 
If the real interest rate exceeds the real rate of growth, i.e. r > y (and the country is initially 
indebted), the debt burden will rise indefinitely. Any deficit on the primary balance is thus 
unsustainable in such cases.  
In the former case of r < y, the long-term debt burden, although finite, might be very high and 
thus the required income transfers would be massive. Such cases might also be deemed 
unsustainable since the willingness to service the debt could be put into question. An 
unexpected, even minor increase of the real interest rate could trigger a default of the debt.  
This simple calculation of the dynamics of the debt burden illustrates the role of the two 
variables, economic growth and the real interest rate. Stronger economic growth for a given 
real interest rate will slow down the growth of the debt burden and in some cases even bring 
the debt burden to a halt. A higher real interest rate for a given rate of real growth will 
increase the long-term debt burden, possibly to unsustainable levels.  
For an assessment of the development of the debt burden, the composition of the current 
account is important, i.e. the current account deficit decomposed into trade and transfer 
deficits (Roubini & Wachtel, 1998). If the current account deficit is primarily caused by a 
deficit in income transfers, this will reflect a more mature and stable structural situation for 
the debt burden, being close to its long-term equilibrium. If, however, the deficit is caused by 
large trade deficits the actual debt burden might still be far below its long-term equilibrium 
and, hence, the deficit should be of more concern.
5  
Attention should also be paid to the sources of the current account deficits – the balance 
between savings and investments (Roubini & Wachtel, 1998). A deficit reflects the 
insufficiency of national savings to finance national investment. As high investment is 
(usually) associated with strong growth, it follows straightforward from the equation for the 
dynamics of the debt burden that a given balance of payments deficit is less concerning if the 
deficit is caused by high investment rather than low savings.  
4.  Economic policy vulnerability for a given level of long-term debt 
burden 
The risk that a chosen economic policy collapses in the longer term depends not only on the 
implications for the long-term debt burden but also on various factors such as 1) the structure 
of capital flows, 2) the public sector deficit, 3) exposure to ‘original sin’ – currency mismatch 
or maturity mismatch of assets and liabilities, 4) the exchange-rate regime and finally 5) the 
degree of openness of the economy and flexibility of the labour market. These factors are 
described in more detail in the following.  
                                                           
5 The ratio between the transfer deficit and the trade deficit is given by iD/hPY. In a steady state where the debt 
burden is given by (5) this equals i/(y-r). The transfer deficit thus varies proportionally with the trade deficit in 
the longer term for given i, y and r. Note that the ratio between the transfer deficit and the trade deficit in the 
longer term increases with the nominal interest rate and hence with the rate of inflation. This is due to money 
illusion when calculating the balance of payments deficit.   6 | HANSEN & HANSEN 
4.1  The structure of capital flows and the role of FDI  
The dominating view concerning the stability of the various sources to finance the balance of 
payments deficits ranks short-term borrowing (‘hot money’) highest on the list as the most 
risky and unstable source of financing. The need for frequent renewals of short-term loans 
provides opportunities for easy withdrawals. Long-term borrowing, on the other hand, is more 
stable as the debtor is allowed more time to solve possible liquidity problems stemming from 
the renewal of a loan. Foreign direct investment is usually perceived to be the most stable 
source of deficit financing. It is argued that foreign direct investment provides a long-term 
commitment where the investor sees the investment materialise in tangible capital that is 
‘bolted down’ in the host country without the possibility to withdraw the capital swiftly. From 
this argument it follows that current account deficits financed by an inflow of foreign direct 
investment makes an economy less prone to a currency crisis. 
Foreign direct investment may also have other effects on the host country apart from being a 
source of financing balance of payments deficits. There are indirect effects on the current 
account and in the longer term on the real rate of growth as well.  
The indirect effects on the current account of foreign direct investment are rather complex and 
they may be both positive and negative. In the very short term, the effect on the trade balance 
is probably negative since the establishment of a subsidiary is likely to trigger investments 
and induce imports of capital goods. Nevertheless, in the longer term, foreign direct 
investment represents not only physical capital but also new technology in the form of 
codified and tacit knowledge and this may lead to import substitution and/or an increase in 
exports. Empirical analysis seems to corroborate the positive relationship between foreign 
direct investment and the trade balance of the host country (see ECE, 2001, Chapter 5 for a 
survey of findings). The same survey also reports strong evidence of a positive relationship 
between the transfer of technology, productivity growth and inflow of foreign direct 
investment. The overall conclusion is therefore that capital inflows in the form of foreign 
direct investment are beneficial for the host economy, partly because it represents a stable 
source of financing of balance of payments deficits and, partly owing to the assumed 
beneficial effects on the trade balance and on the real rate of growth.  
At least three caveats should be kept in mind, however, when contemplating the optimistic 
view on the beneficial effects of foreign direct investment. First, foreign direct investment is 
not an asset of the firm but one of its liabilities and financial claims can easily revert as 
stressed by Fernández-Arias & Hausmann (2001). Physical capital might be bolted down but 
owners of such assets still have the possibility to protect the value of their assets (measured in 
the currency of the home country) from possible exchange-rate loss by hedging and using the 
assets as collateral. Ultimately, the owners may also have the possibility of selling their 
claims in the market and withdraw their money, for example selling their shares and 
converting the revenue to the currency of the sending country. Such endeavours will 
aggravate the problems of a looming currency crisis.  
Second, net inflows of foreign direct investment are in principle a stock adjustment, where 
investors abroad realise their plans to establish a subsidiary in a foreign country. When the 
actual stock of foreign subsidiaries equals the optimal stock, the net flow of new investment 
will decline to a lower level given by the incentive to adjust the existing stock of foreign-
owned capital in accordance to growth of the economies and to offset the depreciation of the 
capital already invested (World Bank, 2003). FDI is therefore not a reliable source of finance 
for balance of payments deficits in the longer term.  BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES | 7 
Third, the prospects of transfers of the income of foreign direct investment may gradually 
pose an unpleasant problem of dividends payments. As argued by Brada & Tomsik (2003) 
theoretical considerations and empirical experience point to the existence of an FDI financial 
life-cycle. In a first phase, profits from foreign direct investment are usually reinvested in the 
host country to finance further expansion of the subsidiaries. Hence, a substantial part of the 
income transfers from foreign investment is automatically financed as no actual payment 
takes place. In a more mature second phase the investor wants to repatriate profits as openly 
paid dividends and at that time the debit side on the current account needs to be financed from 
alternative sources. 
4.2  The public sector deficit 
Attention should also be given to the size of the public deficit. Public deficits may not be fully 
incorporated by optimising consumers in case of non-rationality. A simultaneous deficit on 
the current account and on the public finances may in a future period result in severe negative 
surprises for consumers when the twin deficits are going to be redressed. This risk has been 
framed in the so-called ‘Lawson doctrine’, associated with the former British Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson. The Doctrine states that current account deficits should not be 
a matter of concern if they are caused entirely by private sector imbalances and not by fiscal 
imbalances. This view on the sustainability of a balance of payments deficit has also been 
stated by Corden (1994), who argues that contrary to private agents, politicians are 
myopically driven by ambitions to stay in power. Hence, the public sector may distort 
national savings and investment through public deficits and macroeconomic instability could 
prevail. The Lawson doctrine, however, is seriously challenged by evidence from several 
recent balance of payments crises (Edwards, 2001). A notable example is the Mexican 
currency crisis of 1995, which was preceded by a substantial balance of payments deficit but 
without fiscal imbalances.  
4.3  The problem of original sin 
The quality of the financial markets is also very important for the risk of a currency crisis. If it 
is not possible for a country borrow abroad in its own currency or if it is not possible to 
borrow long-term domestically then a risk of insolvency of domestic companies and financial 
institutions is prevalent in case of a currency crisis. The reason is a currency mismatch or a 
maturity mismatch, which imply balance-sheet effects in case of exchange rate changes or 
changes in the domestic interest rate. This risk has been coined as the problem of ‘original 
sin’ (Fernandez-Arias & Hausmann, 2001). Most obviously, if external debt liabilities are 
denominated in foreign currencies, a depreciation will have direct and immediate balance-
sheet effects as the solvency of firms will be eroded. In a worst case scenario, companies will 
go bankrupt and give impetus to a collapse of output and a surge in unemployment. Argentina 
in 2001–02 provides an ominous example. 
4.4  Exchange-rate regime  
Countries with a fixed exchange-rate regime are the most vulnerable to currency crises. An 
unpleasant policy dilemma exists for troubled economies with a fixed exchange-rate regime. 
On the one hand, frequent small devaluations will ruin the credibility of the system and will 
result in high interest rates. On the other hand, complete rigidity of the parity preclude that 
growing tensions in the exchange market might be eased by a gradual change of the exchange 
rate. If widespread feelings develop, suggesting that the economic policy is too lax, the 8 | HANSEN & HANSEN 
market might ‘test’ the parity by launching a speculative attack. The ability of the central 
bank to defend the parity depends on the size of foreign exchange reserves and its external 
credit facilities. This vulnerability of fixed exchange-rate regimes exists in the case of hard 
pegs, e.g. those institutionalised through currency board arrangements as well as for target-
zone systems, particularly for systems with narrow band margins. In a flexible exchange-rate 
regime or in a target-zone system with wide fluctuation bands the risk of losses and gains for 
agents considering speculating in a change of the exchange rate are considerable and, hence, 
speculative attacks are less likely.  
4.5  Other aspects  
The degree of openness and the flexibility of labour markets are also important factors when 
evaluating the risk of a currency crisis for a given external indebtedness. Open economies are 
more able to restructure and improve the trade balance if the obligations to service the debt 
unexpectedly worsen. The same argument applies if the labour market is flexible.    
The above list of indicators provides information about the vulnerability of a currency crisis. 
If a currency crisis should materialise, however, it also needs a trigger, i.e. a negative shock 
that initiates a vicious circle that is difficult to control by the authorities. An unexpected 
decline in the real rate of growth, an increase in the interest rate or an unexpected real 
appreciation of the currency for a country with a fixed exchange-rate regime could be the 
trigger that initiates a currency crisis. A currency crisis is therefore not predictable in a 
deterministic way but should be seen as a possible outcome in a risk assessment.  
5.  Scrutinising economic development in the Baltics in the past decade 
The theoretical analysis in the two preceding sections outlines a list of relevant factors for an 
assessment of whether or not the present economic policy can be maintained in the longer run. 
This set of indicators will be applied in this section to the three Baltic countries.   
5.1  Prospects for the debt burden: Composition and sources of the deficit 
The current account balance and the trade balance for the Baltic countries are reported in 
Table 1 for the period 1995
6–2002. It appears from the table that current account deficits have 
been the norm in the Baltic countries since 1995. They have usually been very large, almost 
never below 5% of GDP and often exceeding 10%. As is also evident from Table 1, the 
current account deficits are caused by substantial trade deficits implying an upward pressure 
on the debt burden. Yet, as will be noticed later, the massive inflow of FDI has dampened the 
effect from current account deficits on the debt burden.  
On 1 May 2004 the Baltic countries formally acceded to the European Union with the 
obligation later to seek membership of the EMU. These changes of the future institutional 
environment will have a direct impact on the current accounts of the balance of payments. 
The removal of the remaining trade barriers will influence the trade balance, but as both 
exports and imports will be stimulated the net effect on the trade balance is ambiguous. More 
clear is the impact on the balance of income transfers. First, the current accounts may be 
improved because of an increased flow of remittances from labour migrating from the Baltic 
                                                           
6 Data preceding 1995 is notoriously unreliable in all three Baltic countries, which is why 1995 has been chosen 
as the starting point. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES | 9 
countries to the Western European countries. Second, and probably more important, the 
countries will be net recipients of transfers from the EU budget. The Baltic countries are 
expected to benefit substantially from access to the structural funds for member countries of 
the EU. The common agricultural policy may also provide net benefits to the Baltics, 
especially for Lithuania owing to its relatively big agricultural sector.
7 
Table 1. Composition and sources of balance of payments deficits in the Baltic countries, as a 
percentage of GDP 
  Current account  Trade balance
1 Gross  investment  Gross savings 
Estonia       
1995 -4.4  -8.0  26.6  18.8 
1996 -9.1  -11.5  27.8  16.8 
1997 -12.2  -11.6  31.0  17.1 
1998 -9.2  -11.4  29.3  19.7 
1999 -5.7  -6.9  24.5  18.6 
2000 -5.7  -4.0  27.8  20.9 
2001 -6.1  -3.7  28.9  21.8 
2002 -12.3  -7.5  31.4  20.1 
1995-2002, average  -8.1  -8.1  28.4  19.2 
Latvia       
1995 -0.4  -2.4  16.9  17.3 
1996 -5.5  -8.2  18.6  13.1 
1997 -6.1  -8.5  23.1  16.9 
1998 -10.7  -13.6  27.7  17.1 
1999 -9.8  -10.4  26.9  17.2 
2000 -6.9  -9.3  27.0  20.1 
2001 -9.6  -11.1  29.7  20.2 
2002 -7.8  -11.1  28.5  20.7 
1995-2002, average  -7.1  -9.3  24.8  17.8 
Lithuania       
1995 -10.2  -11.8  24.7  14.5 
1996 -9.2  -9.9  21.6  12.5 
1997 -10.2  -10.5  25.4  15.2 
1998 -11.9  -11.7  26.3  14.4 
1999 -11.2  -10.3  23.1  11.9 
2000 -6.0  -6.4  20.2  14.2 
2001 -4.8  -5.5  21.0  16.2 
2002 -5.2  -5.5  22.5  17.7 
1995-2002, average  -8.6  -9.0  23.1  14.6 
Note: 
1Goods and services; small discrepancies between external savings (gross investment minus gross savings) 
and the current account appear as a result of different measuring methods. 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years and authors’ calculations. 
In a recent analysis by Mayhew (2003), the net financial transfers from the European Union to 
the new member states have been assessed. The calculations are based on the present 
                                                           
7 Yet this transfer will be relatively small in the first years of membership as direct subsidies will be paid on a 
sliding scale starting from 25% of the level to the farmers in the old member states in 2004 to full payments in 
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medium-term European Union financial framework for the seven-year period spanning from 
2000 to 2006. The results concerning the Baltic countries are reported below in Table 2.  
Table 2. Net transfers from the EU to the Baltic countries, percentage of gross national 
income (GNI) 
  Estonia Latvia  Lithuania 
2003, pre-accession aid  0.8  0.9  0.8 
2004  1.6 1.9 1.8 
2005  2.2 2.8 2.8 
2006  2.3 3.1 3.2 
Note: Transfers relative to GDP are by and large the same in the table as the difference between GNI and GDP, 
which is usually negligible and does not exceed 6% for any year for any of the three countries. 
Source: Mayhew (2003).  
It appears from Table 2 that the expected net transfers to the Baltic countries from the EU are 
substantial, especially at the end of the present financial framework. This might offset parts of 
the current account deficits, which would otherwise have prevailed. An assessment of the 
future net transfers during the 2007–13 financial framework is not possible as no detailed 
agreement about budgetary issues beyond 2006 has been made at the EU level. It is 
reasonable to assume, however, that given the relative poverty of these countries, the net 
flows to the Baltic countries in 2006 will make up the minimum of what may be expected for 
the following years.  
Baltic data for savings and investment are also reported in Table 1. The current account 
deficit reflects the gap between investments and savings, and optimistic growth expectations 
might have contributed negatively to savings because of incentives to smooth consumption. 
The three countries have performed rather differently regarding the share of gross investment 
to GDP. For the period 1995–2002, Estonia’s level of investment has been high with shares 
ranging between 25% and 31%. For Latvia the share of investments increased from relatively 
low levels of 17–18% in 1995–96 to about 29% for 2002, while, for Lithuania, the evidence 
points at investment shares that have stagnated in the 20–25% range. 
To put those figures into an EU perspective, the share of gross investment to GDP for the EU-
15 countries for the same period hovered in the interval 19.2% (2002) to 21.0% (2000) of 
GDP while the current account was almost in balance, being in an interval of a surplus of 
1.3% (1997) and a deficit of 0.3% (2000), (EU Commission, 2003, Table 78). A simple 
comparison with the EU thus indicates that the large current account deficits in Estonia and 
Latvia are related to high investment levels and not a low level of savings in these two 
countries. The same mitigating feature does not, however, hold for Lithuania where the 
current account deficit goes hand in hand with a quite low level of savings. 
Future growth prospects after EU membership for the eight new Eastern European member 
countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic 
countries) plus the applicant countries Bulgaria and Romania have been assessed in a report 
by the EU Commission (2001). An adapted Solow model was used for an assessment of 
future growth potential.
8 For the period 2000–09 the annual average real rate of growth of 
GDP is projected at 4.0% in a ‘central scenario’ and 4.8% in an ‘optimistic scenario’. The 
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central scenario assumes that the share of gross investment to GDP constitutes around 26–
27% whereas the optimistic scenario assumes an increase in the share of investment from 
around 27% to about 32% during the calibration period. If applied specifically to the three 
Baltic countries, Lithuania falls below this investment condition even for the central scenario. 
Moreover, all three countries need to raise the share of investments significantly to match the 
conditions of the optimistic scenario. But an increase of the investment share may cause a 
further deterioration of the current accounts unless the share of savings does not see at least an 
equivalent increase.  
The brighter growth prospects following EU membership will definitely pose a challenge for 
macroeconomic policy. Investment ratios should be raised to support growth but consumers 
may be inclined to smooth consumption and decreased savings ratios may be envisaged. This 
might aggravate the current account problem and ultimately threaten the growth process.  
Economic growth, however, is not only dependent on the accumulation of physical capital but 
is influenced by a range of other determinants. This is well illustrated by the growth 
performance of Ireland and Portugal over the past decade and the experience from those two 
countries could provide a useful benchmark for an assessment of the possible growth process 
for the Baltic countries. Ten years before the turn of the century, GDP per capita measured at 
current exchange rates was substantially below the EU-15 average in these two countries (see 
Table 3). Nevertheless, during a relatively short span of years, Ireland jumped from a meagre 
70% to 134% of the EU level and Portugal also improved its position, albeit less impressively 
from 38% to 50% of the EU level.
9 
Table 3. A benchmark case: economic growth, investment and current accounts, Ireland and 
Portugal, 1990–2002 
 Ireland  Portugal 
Growth accountancy, average annual percentage changes 
1991-2002 
  
Real GDP  6.9  2.1 
Employment   3.4  1.0 
Capital deepening   0.4  0.4 
Total factor productivity  3.0  0.7 
Gross investment, average percentage of GDP 1991-2002  20.3 25.6 
Share of population aged 25-64 having completed at least 
upper secondary education  
  
1992 42.3  59.2 
2001 19.9  19.8 
Current accounts, percentage of GDP     
Average 1990-2002  1.6  -5.3 
1990 -1.8  -1.0 
2002 -0.9  -7.8 
GDP per capita at current prices (EU–15 =100)     
1990 70.4  37.5 
2002 133.8  52.7 
Note:   Secondary education is defined in accordance with ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education).  
Sources: EU Commission (2003), European Economy, No. 4, Broad Policy Guidelines (for the 2003–05 period), Statistical 
Annex; EU Commission (2003), Eurostat Yearbook 2003, The Statistical Guide to Europe, Data 1991-2001 and 
authors’ calculations.  
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The challenging question is whether a future scenario of the Baltic countries might mimic an 
Irish growth miracle or a Portuguese slower convergence. To explore this question, Tables 3 
and 4 present some key macroeconomic figures for the two benchmark economies, Ireland 
and Portugal, and for the three Baltic countries.  
A closer look at the growth process in Ireland and Portugal reveals interesting differences in 
the nature of growth in the two countries. Table 3 decomposes, based on the Solow approach, 
the overall growth rate into that which is caused by growth in factor inputs (labour and 
capital) and growth of total factor productivity.  
In the Irish case, growth has been associated with high growth rates of employment and total 
factor productivity. Only a minor role can be ascribed to capital deepening, i.e. the increase in 
physical capital per person employed. The average share of investment in Ireland is by and 
large at the same level as the present shares in Lithuania, which, as mentioned earlier, fall 
below the target shares used in the EU Commission’s growth calculation. In contrast, capital 
deepening has played a more important role for economic growth in Portugal as the larger 
shares of investment have translated into growth through capital deepening. The recent 
experiences from the two countries thus offer the insight that high investment shares are 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for fast growth, at least not in the medium term.  
The astonishingly high growth in Ireland has been dealt with in several analyses (Coorey et 
al., 1999 and Honohan & Walsh, 2002). These analyses point in particular to three factors that 
have benefited growth in Ireland. First, the very strong growth has been possible because of 
an ample supply of labour from various sources (see Table 4). The activity rate – the labour 
force as a share of population aged 15 to 64 – has increased substantially during the 1990s 
(not least owing to a larger participation rate among women) from a relatively low level in 
1990. A dramatically shrinking unemployment rate, the much diminished role of labour from 
an initially large agricultural sector and the reversal of Ireland’s long history of emigration 
have contributed to secure a flexible labour supply during the several years of high growth.
10 
Second, the educational attainment of the population is also quite high and has even improved 
significantly during the last decade, and this feature of the labour market has facilitated 
growth in technically advanced sectors. Third, strong international competitiveness of the 
Irish economy has stimulated aggregate demand and enabled growth without severe balance 
of payments problems – in fact for most of the years during the 1990s the Irish current 
account was in surplus. Finally, Ireland has benefited from its trade openness and its huge 
inflow of FDI, which has raised productivity substantially, especially because established 
subsidiaries have been export-oriented industries (Barry, 2000).
11 Nevertheless, because of 
these highly profitable foreign-owned subsidiaries and the interest service on foreign debt 
accumulated in previous periods gross national income is considerably lower (but not low 
anymore!) than gross domestic product.  
 
                                                           
10 As analysed more extensively by Honohan & Walsh (2002), the Irish and UK labour markets are very 
integrated through migration, which is sensitive to differences in economic growth in the two countries.  
11 The very high growth of total factor productivity might exaggerate the real productivity growth because of 
transfer pricing. Friendly taxation of corporate income in Ireland provides an incentive for multinationals to let 
income appear in Ireland and this will be reflected in measured productivity in Ireland (see Honohan & Walsh, 
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A comparison of the structural indicators in Tables 3 and 4 for Ireland and Portugal illustrate 
the more limited growth potential for Portugal on all accounts apart from the share of 
investment.
12 Noticeable in particular is the lower educational attainment in Portugal, the 
substantial balance of payments deficits in Portugal and the wedge between gross domestic 
product and gross domestic income because of foreign debt.  
Table 4. Growth framework for Ireland, Portugal and the Baltic countries, various years 
  Ireland Portugal  Estonia Latvia  Lithuania 
Activity rate
1        
1990 60.9  69.7       
2001  68.4 71.9 69.9 68.0 70.4 
Unemployment rate        
1990 13.4  4.8       
2001 3.8  4.1  12.4  13.1  16.5 
Share of employment in 
agriculture       
1990   13.6  12.8       
2002  7.0 10.9 7.1 15.1  16.5 
Degree of openness
2       
1990 54.7  36.2       
2002  84.4 34.0 88.9 50.8    57.0   
Inward stock of FDI, 
$ per capita        
1990 9757  1057       
2002  40220  4256 3105 1164 1148 
GNI/GDP       
1990 0.89  0.89       
2002    0.80 0.90 0.95 1.00 0.99 
Notes: 
1 Activity rate represents the labour force as a percentage of the population aged 15-64 years.  
2 Exports plus imports divided by two times GDP.  
Sources: Eurostat (2002), Employment in Europe: Recent Trends and Prospects; EU Commission, European 
Economy, various years; UNCTAD FDI Database; IMF, Financial Statistics, various years and authors’ 
calculations.  
Table 4 also allows a comparison of the present structural indicators for the Baltic countries 
with similar indicators for Ireland and Portugal from 1990, the year that initiates a decade of 
very different growth performance for those two countries. Two main conclusions are 
apparent: first, the three Baltic countries differ internally in their structure; second, none of 
the three Baltic countries fully matches the indicators of either Ireland or Portugal in 1990.  
Reasons for some growth optimism might be found in an ample labour supply because of high 
unemployment, and for Latvia and Lithuania a potential labour supply from the future 
restructuring from agriculture to other industries. Yet the activity rates are already quite high 
and very similar to the situation in Portugal in 1990, thus probably not leaving any major 
potential for an increase in the labour supply.  
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On the optimistic side is also the relatively high educational level in all three Baltic countries 
although comparative measures are difficult to establish. The high degree of trade openness 
and a substantial inflow of FDI places Estonia closer to the Irish case – in contrast with Latvia 
and Lithuania, which seem more to mirror the Portuguese case. All three Baltic countries 
suffer from severe balance of payments deficits, which under the present exchange-rate 
regimes might endanger future strong growth if no determined efforts to improve international 
competitiveness take place. The pattern is therefore quite complex. Most of the indicators 
paint an optimistic picture for an assessment of the growth prospects, especially in the case of 
Estonia.   
5.2  Vulnerability of the economic policy 
The stability of capital flows 
All three Baltic countries have experienced massive inflows of foreign direct investment, 
which have financed a substantial part of the current account deficits of these countries. For 
some years the net inflows of FDI have even exceeded the current account deficits (Table 5), 
allowing either for a reduction of net foreign debt or for an increase in foreign exchange 
reserves. 
Membership of the EU and the economic and monetary union might also temporarily 
stimulate net inflows of foreign direct investment to the Baltic countries owing to the 
credibility of membership. This may ease the financial problem of a current account deficit in 
the vulnerable period in the near future when the Baltic countries must display exchange-rate 
stability.
13 
The conclusion to be drawn is that the composition of the capital inflows supports the less 
concerned view about the possible dangers for the economic policy of the large current 
account deficits. It should be noted, however, that the FDI inflows, albeit substantial, have 
been highly volatile and since foreign direct investment inflow represents a stock adjustment 
this contribution to financing the deficits will eventually come to a halt.  
Furthermore, the large inflow of foreign direct investment to the Baltic countries in recent 
years could cause large future payment obligations in the form of dividends. Foreign direct 
investment income will increase substantially in the future and, sticking to the FDI financial 
life-cycle hypothesis, the balance of payments deficits may be more difficult to finance.
14 
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 provide some dark omens of this future burden as the figures 
show that reinvested earnings in the late 1990s have been very substantial, especially in 
Estonia. 
 
                                                           
13 The effects on the flows of foreign direct investments of a reduction of trade barriers are ambiguous from a 
theoretical point of view. On the one hand, the decline of trade costs weakens the incentive to set-up a subsidiary 
in foreign markets, as exporting will become cheaper and by concentrating production in one location only, cost 
efficiency improves because of internal economies of scale. On the other hand, market integration makes it more 
important for a company to be present in the partner country and this points to a positive effect of membership 
on foreign direct investment. Based on previous experience from enlargements, the latter effect seems to 
dominate.  
14 The reported actual foreign direct-investment income as well as reinvested earnings might, as mentioned by 
Brada & Tomsik (2003), be underestimated as some accumulation of tangible and intangible capital in the 
company’s accountancy could be reported as costs. The figures in Table 5 therefore underestimate the existing 
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Table 5. Current account deficits, FDI capital flows and FDI-related income transfers to the 
Baltic countries, as a percentage of GDP 
  Current account  FDI inflow (net)  Direct investment 
income (net) 
Reinvested direct 
investment income (net) 
Estonia        
1995 -4.4 -  -  - 
1996 -9.1  2.4  -0.5  0.1 
1997 -12.2  2.8 -2.5  1.9 
1998 -9.2  11.0  -1.4  0.5 
1999 -5.7  4.3  -1.8  0.8 
2000 -5.7  6.3  -3.7  2.0 
2001 -6.1  6.0  -5.1  4.0 
2002 -12.3  2.4 -5.3  2.5 
Latvia        
1995 -0.4 -  -  - 
1996 -5.5  7.4  -0.9  0.7 
1997 -6.1  9.1  -1.2  0.9 
1998 -10.7  5.0 -1.2  0.9 
1999 -9.8  5.0  -1.9  1.3 
2000 -6.9  5.6  -0.8  0.8 
2001 -9.6  2.0  -1.4  0.8 
2002 -7.8  4.6  -2.0  1.2 
Lithuania        
1995 -10.2 -  -  - 
1996 -9.2  1.9  -0.3  0.3 
1997 -10.2  3.4  -  0.8  0.5 
1998 -11.9  8.6 -1.2  0.9 
1999 -11.2  4.5 -1.4  1.3 
2000 -6.0  3.3  -0.4  0.8 
2001 -4.8  3.7  -1.2  0.7 
2002 -5.2  5.1  -0.8  0.5 
Note:   Reinvested earnings are gross for Latvia for the years 1996, 1999 and 2000 and for Lithuania for 1996. 
Reinvested earnings invested abroad are negligible for all three Baltic countries for the years where 
those figures are reported.  
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years; IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 
various years and authors’ calculations.  
Public finances  
As is apparent from Table 6, public finances have been largely sound in all the Baltic 
countries. Public budgets have for most of the period been close to balance and even in 
surplus for some of the years reported. This is therefore a positive element in the assessment 
of the current account deficits of the Baltic countries, whether or not the Lawson doctrine 
applies. 
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Table 6. General government budget balance, as a percentage of GDP 
  Estonia Latvia  Lithuania 
1995 -0.6  -4.0  -4.8 
1996 -0.8  -1.6  -3.6 
1997 2.5  0.7  -1.9 
1998 -0.1  0.1  -0.4 
1999 -0.2  -3.6  -7.1 
2000 0.2  -2.7  -1.3 
2001 2.3  -1.4  -0.4 
2002   1.2
1   -1.9  -1.2 
Notes:
   1 Estimate. 
Sources: IMF (2003), International Financial Statistics; Statistical Office of Estonia; and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (2003), Transition Report.  
Foreign debt, foreign-owned assets and original sin  
In spite of the persistent high level of current account deficits in all three Baltic countries, net 
debt as a percentage of GDP was still at a one-digit level for both Estonia and Latvia and 
made up less than 20% for Lithuania at the end of 2002 (Table 7). These levels do not seem 
alarming. The reason for the modest growth of foreign debt to GDP is the massive inflow of 
FDI and also the strong economic growth. 
Table 7. Foreign debt, inward stock of FDI and foreign-owned assets, as a percentage of 
GDP 
  Foreign debt (net)  Inward stock of FDI  Foreign-owned assets 
Estonia      
2000 3.2  51  54 
2001 2.7  58  62 
2002 3.1  -  - 
Latvia      
2000 8.0  29  37 
2001 9.5  31  41 
2002 8.9  -  - 
Lithuania      
2000 22.1  21  43 
2001 20.8  22  43 
2002 18.1  -  - 
Sources: Statistical Office of Estonia (2003), Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania – in Figures 2003. 
The inward stock of FDI to GDP has therefore risen considerably for all three countries but 
mostly for Estonia, where the inward stock constituted approximately 58% of GDP by the end 
of 2001. Adding foreign debt to the inward stock of FDI gives the stock of foreign-owned 
assets. For all three Baltic countries this stock of foreign-owned assets made up around half of 
GDP by the end of 2002. This figure reveals some information about the future flow of 
income transfers. If the capital-output ratio in a catching-up country is assessed, roughly, to 
be about two, a quarter of capital income constitutes the income transfer to foreign owners 
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Nevertheless, given the high productivity of capital in the Baltic countries the stock of 
foreign-owned capital reflects an efficient allocation of capital that might benefit the citizens 
of the Baltic countries through higher real wages as well as the capital owners abroad owing 
to a higher real return on capital.   
The data available does not allow for an empirical assessment of the problem of original sin. 
All casual evidence leaves no doubt, however, that foreign borrowing in the Baltic countries 
is denominated in foreign currencies, mainly in euros and US dollars. It leaves the countries 
vulnerable to balance-sheet effects in case of changes in the current parities. Yet, this does not 
seem to be a big problem given the relatively low debt burden for all three countries. 
Exchange-rate regime and other aspects 
The present fixed exchange-rate systems in the Baltic countries have delivered monetary 
stability in recent years but have exposed the countries to higher risks of a currency crisis 
compared with flexible exchange-rate regimes. The risk of currency crises has been limited by 
a high degree of openness of the Baltic countries measured by the share of exports and 
imports to GDP. This ensures a high capability to influence the current accounts through 
changes in economic policy and hence provides foreign creditors with the belief that debt 
obligations will be met. The Baltic countries are also perceived to have a high degree of 
flexibility in their labour markets because of weak trade unions and low levels of welfare 
benefits, which also contributes to reducing the risk of currency crises.  
More important for sustainability than the above-mentioned effects are the expected changes 
of the monetary policy regimes for the new member countries after accession. The new 
member countries are committed to eventually join the EMU and adopt the euro. In the 
interim period the new member countries should as a first step join the ERM II – a target-zone 
system with the euro as anchor currency. To avoid a ‘double-regime shift’ the existing 
currency board arrangements in Estonia and Lithuania have been accepted as a substitute for 
participation in the ERM II system.
15 Latvia is expected to re-peg the lat from the SDR to the 
euro by 1 January 2005 and at the same time join the ERM II. After at least two years of 
exchange-rate stability within the ERM II and after fulfilling the other convergence criteria 
for ‘sound public finances’ as well as for inflation and interest-rate convergence, the countries 
can apply to the European Council of Ministers for adoption of the euro.  
The new member countries face a dilemma when planning the timetable for adopting the 
euro. On the one hand, the accession countries are still in a transition process from the 
planned economy of half a century. In this still-ongoing restructuring process the countries 
might benefit from having the exchange-rate instr u m e n t  a s  a  l a s t  r e s o r t  i n  c a s e  o f  a n  
asymmetric shock between the EU and the new member states. This points to a relatively long 
period before the euro should be adopted. On the other hand, adopting the euro eliminates 
once and for all the risk of a currency crisis and by this argument a short interim period is to 
be preferred.  
The Baltic countries will probably go for a swift change to the euro. The fixed exchange-rate 
systems during the past decade have delivered monetary stability without severe problems. 
Furthermore, the public finances are not in disarray in any of the three Baltic countries so the 
Maastricht criterion of public deficits not exceeding 3% of GDP is not a serious hindrance for 
membership of the EMU.  
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Nevertheless, ‘demand’ for membership should be matched by ‘supply’ of membership of the 
eurozone if the entrance into the EMU is to become a reality. Regarding the supply of 
membership, the final decision of accepting new member countries will be taken by the 
European Council of Ministers, wherein voting rights are only available to the present group 
of euro countries. There are no signs, however, that EMU membership for the new member 
countries will be blocked or delayed by the incumbent countries, so a plausible scenario could 
see the Baltic countries adopting the euro after three to five years of membership in the EU 
(2007–09).  
6.  Concluding remarks 
A superficial glance at the main macroeconomic indicators for the three Baltic countries 
reveals several positive trends but also one major issue of concern: the very substantial and 
persistent deficits on the current accounts of the balance of payments, implying a risk for the 
fixed exchange-rate policies and the smooth process towards the eventual adoption of the 
euro. This working paper has dealt with these topics and presented a picture with more 
nuances.  
At least three issues have been highlighted:  
1)  Many – but not all – indicators support a less concerned view on the balance of payments 
problems. 
2)  The problems of current account deficits are neither similar nor equally serious in the 
three Baltic countries.  
3)  Even in the absence of devaluation and with a successful entry into EMU some three to 
five years from now, the current account deficits will remain an important issue although 
the focus will shift from possible devaluation to the development of standards of living.  
Supporting a less concerned view on the balance of payments problem are indicators such as 
public finances (generally sound), low levels of debt, EU membership (increased income 
transfers from EU structural funds will alleviate current account problems), huge inflows of 
FDI (not ‘hot money’), very open economies and flexible labour markets. On the negative 
side are the size and persistence of the deficits on the balance of payments, the prospect of a 
substantial decrease of the net inflow of FDI because of completion of the capital stock 
adjustment and an increasing outflow of dividends in the second part of the FDI financial 
cycle. The latter has still not appeared (except to some extent in Estonia, see Table 5) and may 
appear too late to put pressure on the exchange rates as a result of the upcoming adoption of 
the euro. Also on the negative side is the problem of original sin, especially for Lithuania 
where foreign debt is substantially higher than in the two other countries. 
Although all three Baltic countries have had large deficits on balance of payments for all 
years since 1995, the ranking of countries by size of deficit has changed. Currently, the deficit 
is the highest in Estonia and the smallest in Lithuania. Yet it may be argued (see Table 1) that 
the issue is more problematic in Lithuania. In Estonia the deficit may be viewed as mainly 
caused by very substantial investment whereas for Lithuania it is to a larger extent caused by 
a low savings rate. Moreover, budget deficits have consistently been lower and foreign debt 
much smaller in Estonia than in Lithuania, portraying, perhaps, that Lithuania’s exchange-rate 
regime as shakier than Estonia’s. Latvia appears somewhere in between. 
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In the case of a successful adoption of the euro, the current account deficits will cease to be 
possible indicators of devaluation – but they will neither cease to exist nor cease to be of 
importance. Rather, the focus will shift. The increasing external debt and the increasing share 
of foreign ownership of Baltic companies, which is implied by the deficits, will cause an 
increase in the flows of income transfers abroad and thereby widen the gap between GDP and 
gross national income (GNI) – and it is GNI that is the relevant measure for standards of 
living. Nevertheless, the huge FDI inflow embedded in subsidiaries, which produce and 
export, points to a strong growth effect and the gap between GDP and GNI might reflect 
intertemporal optimisation by consumption-smoothing consumers in a financially integrated 
world economy.  
The main conclusion in this working paper is therefore that the large deficits in the current 
accounts of the Baltic countries pose some risk for the sustainability for the fixed exchange-
rate policies and ultimately for the endeavours of these countries to keep their economies on a 
fast track of convergent growth to the EU level of standards of living.  
To minimise the risk it seems important that the economic policies of these countries preserve 
and even improve their international competitiveness through a strategy based on monetary 
stability and fiscal prudence. As the fundamental equilibrium real exchange-rate tends to 
appreciate, owing to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, a policy that ensures a rate of inflation not 
above the level in the eurozone will gradually lead to an improvement of the international 
competitiveness for given nominal exchange-rates. Such a strategy will not only minimise the 
risk of a currency crisis but also ease the way to adopting the euro.  
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